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Introduction

A

ccording to his critics, Carl von Clausewitz believed war was entirely
governed by reason and controlled by the dictates of policy. Martin van
Creveld claims Clausewitz viewed war as little more than a “rational instrument for the attainment of rational social ends;”1 and Barbara Ehrenreich states
Clausewitz saw “war itself as an entirely rational undertaking, unsullied by
human emotion.”2 Yet these assertions, viewed outside their proper context,
distort Clausewitz’s contribution. His ideas are more complex than these
crude depictions of strict political rationalism suggest. Indeed, Clausewitz
believed that logic often came to a stop in the labyrinth of war.3 There is no
simple, pithy explanation of the manner in which the political element fits
into his theory; no formulaic or linear characterization will suffice.
This article seeks to reveal the depth of Clausewitz’s insight into the
relationship between politics and war. Ideas of politics, policy, and reason
hold a number of differing implications in terms of their relationship to one
another and their influence on war. Indeed, misinterpretations of Clausewitz
stem from the complexity of the subject itself, combined with its somewhat
limited and confusing presentation in On War.4 This is cause for detailed
analysis of the text, the logic of Clausewitz’s thought on the subject, and the
implications of his ideas.
Dr. Thomas Waldman is Research Fellow in Post-War Recovery at the Post-War
Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), University of York, U.K. He has M.A.
degrees in Research Methods in Politics/International Relations (Distinction) and
International Studies (Distinction), from the University of Sheffield, as well as a Ph.D.
in International Studies from the Univerity of Warwick.
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War as an Instrument of Policy
That war is an instrument of policy has become something of a
truism, almost to the point of cliché, in Western strategic literature, regardless of how well the complexities of the idea are understood. The ubiquity
of the idea can largely be attributed to Clausewitz; direct reference is often
made to On War whenever this principle is outlined. The idea is commonly
quoted out of the context Clausewitz intended, diminishing it of much of its
meaning. Also, it is often mistakenly presented as representing the totality
of his theorizing on war. Its most common modern usage is as a prescriptive
device—one especially suited to modern liberal democracies in which the
subordination of the military to civilian control is deemed a vital component
of a properly constituted state, especially in the nuclear age.5 The complexities of the concept are often diluted in the interest of doctrinal precision
and pedagogical clarity. Given the profusion of critiques in relation to this
aspect of Clausewitz’s thought, this situation will not suffice. A more robust
explanation is required.
Clausewitz wrote that war contains an “element of subordination,
as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.”6 This
claim may appear cold-blooded and militaristic, but his assertion is descriptive, not prescriptive. This is confused by the fact that Clausewitz often
draws prescriptive conclusions on the basis of this observation, and the
two perspectives are often juxtaposed in the text. It is perhaps ironic that
what appears to be a morally repugnant statement, because it suggests he
viewed resorting to force as an “entirely routine extension of unilateral state
policy”7—actually leads Clausewitz to conclude that war, in a practical and
moral sense, ought to be subject to policy; otherwise, it becomes “something
pointless and devoid of sense.”8
Ostensibly, the concept of war as an instrument of policy is straightforward. The use of military force is a means to a higher end—the political
object. War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such,
has a measure of rational utility. So, the purpose for which the use of force is
intended will be the major determinant of the course and character of a war.
As Clausewitz explains, war “is controlled by its political object,” which
“will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required,
and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational
detail.”9 This idea is clearly reflected in his work where he discusses distinctly rational chains of action that establish a purpose to be achieved, a
military aim that serves the purpose, and the selection of means appropriate
to attain the aim.10
According to this hierarchically structured logic, we should essentially be able to explain, in broad terms, the actions of individual units
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by the overarching demands of policy, because all parts stand in logical
relation to it. The control of policy might manifest itself in, for instance,
setting geographical limits on
an army’s movements or
War is a tool that policy uses to
establishing the appropriate
achieve its objectives and, as such,
moment to seek a negotiated
has a measure of rational utility.
settlement. This perspective
does not necessarily minimize
the importance of military considerations; war “is entitled to require that
the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.”
Policy should understand the capabilities and limits of the instrument it
employs. The crucial point is that military actions are ultimately geared
towards political objectives; military concerns “will never do more than
modify them.”11 One might use the analogy of cogs in a machine: the movement of the smallest cogs is determined by the master cog of policy; when
it turns, all others turn in relation to it.
In this abstract conception, all action in war rationally relates to the
given purpose. When, for example, the stated object is achieved, one would
terminate the war; or where the sacrifices become too great in relation to
the purpose, one would seek a settlement or capitulate the value attached to
political object rules, not military success. As Clausewitz notes, because “it
is policy that has created war,” it is only natural that it remains subordinate
to the “guiding intelligence that brought it into existence.”12 In one of his
more rational passages, Clausewitz notes that “the value of the object must
determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.
Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object,
the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”13 The assumption is
leaders choose what they believe to be the most appropriate means to attain
the desired end, and that will remain the principal criterion of efforts made
and resources employed. The particular military solution depends on circumstances and the object in question. As Clausewitz notes, there are many
potential roads to victory and a “general can best demonstrate his genius by
managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and his resources, doing
neither too much nor too little.”14
The description above, while capturing the essence of the issue, by
no means represents the extent of Clausewitz’s ideas. If it did, accusations of
pure rationalism would, no doubt, be justified. The idea of a rational process
supports the concept of war as subordinate to policy but only to an extent.
Where Clausewitz discusses purpose and means or war plans, his intention
is clearly prescriptive and represents an ideal strategic construct whereby
all parts gel seamlessly into a rationally directed whole. This perspective
is most clear in Book 8 where Clausewitz states: “War plans cover every
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aspect of war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a
single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled.”15
Undoubtedly, this idea is seductive and perhaps reflective of the state
servant in Clausewitz. While his ultimate intention in On War was to describe
the objective nature of war, this did not prevent him from passionately promoting his ideas regarding how war should be fought. These perspectives
sit together uneasily in his work, and one should be careful to distinguish
between the two. Nevertheless, Clausewitz stressed the great difficulties that
he knew, in reality, intervened in such theoretically neat relationships:
The degree of force that must be used against the enemy depends on
the scale of political demands on either side. These demands, so far
as they are known, would show what efforts each must make; but
they seldom are fully known . . . . Nor are the situation and conditions of the belligerents alike. This can be a second factor . . . . Just
as disparate are the governments’ strength of will, their character and
abilities . . . . These three considerations introduce uncertainties that
make it difficult to gauge the amount of resistance to be faced and, in
consequence, the means required and the objectives to be set.16

This means that any strictly logical solution is impossible; indeed, in
war, such reasoning may prove to be “a most unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool.” Rather, what is required is intuitive judgment “to detect the most
important and decisive elements in the vast array of facts and situations,”
which requires decisions and behavior not strictly derived from rational processes or abstract principles. Clausewitz certainly did not believe that any
superlative standard of the rational use of force, maximizing the interests
of policy-makers, was humanly possible.17 The form of instrumental logic
described above will, Clausewitz held, be apparent in any war, but the extent
of its influence will be extenuated by many factors: instruments may be used
for purposes other than those that they were ostensibly designed for, be illsuited to certain tasks, or employed by the user ineffectively.
Clausewitz emphasizes that war’s subordination to policy by no
means entails complete control. Subordination, he explains, “does not
imply that the political aim is a tyrant.” Just as subordinate commanders can
disobey orders and follow their own inclinations, so too can war in relation
to policy. Policy, he states, “will permeate all military operations, and, in
so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.” Clausewitz was clear in his assertion that, even though the
political aim will remain the first consideration, because the “prime cause
of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it,” war
can often escape the control of its user.18 The primacy of policy has been
overstated in the literature, with the result that some scholars, particularly
during the Cold War, believed Clausewitz’s theory presented a doctrine. If
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followed, this doctrine would restrict force “to a scale that is no greater than
necessary to achieve the objectives at stake.”19 But, as Echevarria notes, the
instrument “is a dynamic one. War involves living forces rather than static
elements; thus, it can change quickly and significantly in ways the logic of
policy may not expect.”20
The concept of war’s subordination to policy causes us to focus on
an important aspect of war relating to the extent to which, from the perspective of individual groups involved, there is a constant, albeit messy,
interaction between the ends and means at every level. This weaves a thread
of reason throughout the whole, even if it may appear to be absent in some
conflicts. Ceasing the analysis here would ignore a central idea Clausewitz
wanted to convey. Indeed, mistaken interpretations often stem from a failure
to explore beyond policy into the more complex realm of politics.
From Subordination to Continuation
As Clausewitz stressed, war is a multilateral and interactive phenomenon. So how can it be described simply as the instrument of one or
both parties? To answer this we need to return to the text and examine the
manner in which policy should be understood—as one aspect of a multilateral, interactive, and complex whole.21
At the beginning of Book 8, Chapter 6B, Clausewitz provides one of
his clearest expressions of the relationship between war and politics. Over
the first five paragraphs, the context of the discussion relates to the total
political situation, as distinct from unilateral policy. Clausewitz explains
how the “source of war is politics—the intercourse of governments and
peoples” and a “continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of
other means.” War’s salient factors are political or “so closely connected with
political activity that it is impossible to separate the two.” The final sentence
of the fifth paragraph explains that war, “cannot follow its own laws, but
has to be treated as some other whole; the name of which is policy.”22 This
reversion to the term policy represents a change in Clausewitz’s argument
and the rest of the chapter is more obviously concerned with the unilateral,
instrumental perspective, which is natural given that Clausewitz is dealing
with war plans. He then synonymously refers to policy, political decisions,
and political objectives.
Clausewitz is keen to draw attention to the importance of the broad
political situation out of which war arises; war’s instrumentality emerges
so seamlessly out of this idea of interactive politics that the reader almost
misses the transition from one to the other. As natural as this interconnectivity
may have seemed to Clausewitz, students of his philosophies have struggled
with it. This seamlessness is the first clue to his belief in the indissoluble
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connection between politics and war; that one is inherently implicated in
the other. This thought is clarified in Clausewitz’s narrative in Book 1. It
is here that policy and politics are even more intertwined and treated as
one. Crucially, in Section 23, Chapter 1, Clausewitz states, “When whole
communities go to war . . . the reason always lies in some political situation,
and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is
an act of policy.” Policy is presented as an intrinsic element of the political
situation, essentially arising out of it. The discussion continues largely from
the perspective of unilateral policy. The instrumental nature of war is reaffirmed in Section 24, where its connection to politics is stressed: “[W]ar is
not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of
political intercourse, carried on with other means.”23
War as an instrument of policy is presented almost nowhere as independent from the idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse. From
an objective viewpoint, war, as a whole, emerges from a political situation
between belligerents and propels the central conflict without suspending the
initial intercourse. It is natural to switch abruptly to the policy perspective,
because the political situation is the interaction between the belligerents’
individual policies. War is a continuation of the political situation and an
instrument employed by the groups that comprise the situation.
Once the reader acknowledges that the idea of war as a continuation of politics is inescapably implicated in the concept of subordination
to policy, they can move away from the ideal of controlled instrumentality.
Indeed, the idea of subordination takes on a very different meaning in so
far as it is war’s very subordination to policy, and by extension politics,
that makes its rational control extremely difficult. Politics as a process is
irrational; thus, if war is a continuation of that process, it too is irrational.
Although belligerents in war generally act according to their objectives,
they do so in a complex, multilateral, and interactive environment pervaded
by uncontrollable external political dynamics and chance occurrences. War
is shaped by not only the reasoned objectives and decisions of each actor,
but also the complex nature of the political dynamics that their interaction
produces, which are inherently unpredictable and irrational.
The Political Logic of War
To state that war is a continuation of politics is to make a point
beyond war’s instrumentality. Continuation powerfully conveys the idea
that war is itself a form of political behavior, and thus, even if subjective
policy loses control of its instrument, the lines that run through war remain
fundamentally political in nature. This idea cannot be overstated because,
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as Clausewitz states, the concept of subordination may encourage the belief
that war is something entirely different from politics because:
It is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces
it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own . . . .
[But] war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it
into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which
military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political
lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace.24

To clarify his position Clausewitz provides a powerful metaphor:
while war might have its own unique grammar, the underlying logic of war
is always political. Naturally, armed groups decide how best to defeat the
enemy based on military operational realities, somewhat in isolation from
political concerns, and war’s grammar. As Clausewitz conveys through
his abstract concept of absolute war, that tends to emphasize the annihilation of the enemy.25 The idea of subordination does not suggest war is
entirely governed by political considerations; commanders should be free
to use their judgment in determining how best to achieve the military aim
outlined in policy.
War is a means and has its own peculiar character—the dynamics
of combat—that distinguishes it from typical political behavior. But, as the
concept of continuation conveys, at its heart, war is political behavior. War
substitutes the use of force for speech or writing and represents a different
expression of the thoughts of political leaders.26 Continuation underlines
why war should never be viewed as representing a unity. The idea of subordination enables us to envision a strong relationship, yet can be concurrently
misleading, in that it implies the substitution of political behavior by military force. The idea of continuation goes further, emphasizing that war’s
complete autonomy is impossible because of its indissoluble connection to
political behavior.27 Both are social forces that determine the distribution of
power among groups, even if the means of war—its grammar—are distinctive and possess their own dynamics and principles. The instrument of war
may take many forms and serve many purposes, but its universal essence
can be grasped when it is understood that policy is inherently embedded in
the perpetual realm of the political, within which the use of force is but a
continuation of that interaction with altered means. It is in this respect that
Clausewitz could state that all wars are things of the same nature.28
Even if this concept is completely understood, there is still room for
confusion, because history reveals countless occasions when practitioners
and theorists alike have rejected it. In fact, the default position has been one
that emphasizes a clear separation between the two: the belief that once war
begins, politics end and success can only be achieved by military means.
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This conception is mistaken, for it confuses a necessary relationship with
a mere point of view. For instance, by extolling battle, Napoleon was able
to secure repeated military victories, while generating a political environment fundamentally inimical to the survival of his empire: war will have
political consequences however much practitioners may believe or desire
otherwise. War may be an instrument, but if it is to prove an effective one it
should be deftly handled—often along with other policy tools—otherwise
politics has a habit of delivering its own verdict on events. As Clausewitz
noted, “War does not contain in itself the elements for a complete decision
and final settlement.”29
Any commander may fervently subscribe to the notion that war
should be fought regardless of political imperatives. This position is understandable, yet objectively irrelevant and simply reveals the way in which
war can be subjectively mishandled. The effects of such mishandling will
ultimately be political. Outright military victory may be the most appropriate way of achieving one’s objective, but history has shown that it may not.
Modern counterinsurgency operations reveal that the use of overwhelming
force may prove strategically counterproductive. As the proverb relates: war
is too important to be left to the generals. Yet, if war is never autonomous,
how does politics interact with and impact the phenomenon?
The Political Web of War
A major implication of the assertion that war is a continuation of
politics is that the panoply of perpetually shifting relations within, between,
and beyond individual groups will shape the course of war. Clausewitz
states, “wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations
which give rise to them.”30 The political web within which war takes place
greatly influences the types of policies adopted, decisions taken, and actions
initiated in war. This proposition—perhaps underrated by Clausewitz, at
least explicitly in On War—helps account for many otherwise inexplicable
events and developments in past wars. Indeed, sometimes action that makes
sense militarily is apt to be entirely subverted by politics.
This is particularly apparent with respect to the impact of internal
politics on war. Decisions made will not always be geared toward strategic
or military imperatives, but might be influenced by electoral politics, departmental turf-wars, or inter-service rivalry. In such cases, political interests that
override strategic pragmatism may be detrimental to the accomplishment
of policy aims.31 A prominent instance of internal politics driving strategic
decision-making is the phenomenon of foreign wars begun by states to stave
off an impending domestic insurrection or to strengthen national unity. Such
political dynamics compound the difficulty of arriving at a clear political
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purpose or ensuring military operations are conducted according to achievable objectives. Where extraneous political concerns impinge on strategic
decisions, soldiers can find themselves being sacrificed for the sake of a
politician’s position, industrial contractor’s profits, or the continuance of
amicable relations with allies.
Wars, or events within war, are often utilized as political tools for
interests that differ from proclaimed objectives. Whatever the form of such
hidden motives and influences, these simply reflect the political web in
which war takes place and from which it cannot be isolated. Policy-makers
and commanders are inevitably entwined in this political web. The cynical
reasons for which force is often employed may degrade the purity of policy,
but it remains policy nonetheless and will invariably impact war, potentially
to its detriment.
As such, this underlines the paradoxical impact of politics on war.
On one hand, policy provides war with a rational structure, whereby belligerents seek to attain their ends through the reasoned use of force. On the
other hand, it is embedded in what we have termed the political web of war,
and this constitutes one of the greatest barriers to rational strategic behavior.
War is inextricably ensconced within and impacted by a whole range of
political forces beyond the manipulation of individual actors—a substance
“removed from means and purpose that can be steered by the will.”32
Nonlinearity and Dynamic Feedback
The analysis so far has examined the relationship between politics
and war in a predominantly static, linear fashion to elucidate the basic concepts. As Alan Beyerchen notes, “the conventional approach . . . envisions a
compartmentalization of politics and war in a linear sequence—first comes
politics/policies, then war, then politics/policies again to make or maintain
peace.”33 The concept of subordination paints a picture of a one-way relationship, whereby policy sets the goals for war to achieve and remains the
chief consideration throughout, until the objective is either attained, lost,
or marginally accomplished. This is not the image Clausewitz intended to
convey. In fact, he believed there would be a constant, complex, dynamic,
and nonlinear feedback process between politics, policy, and war. He notes
that “the political situation can change from year to year”34 and, more importantly, “the original political objects can greatly alter during the course of
the war and may finally change entirely since they are influenced by events
and their probable consequences.”35
Because the major lines that run through war are political, military
developments will have political effects, which affect the decisions and
calculations of leaders. Thus, in war there is a constant interplay between
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objectives and the use of force, ends, and means. The incredible complexity this observation encompasses means that, in theoretical terms, the best
one can hope for is to draw attention to its prominent characteristics. The
concept of continuation emphasized the belligerents’ roles in continually
creating new political realities. Because new power relationships are created
during the course of war, the interests of third parties, domestic factions, and
local populations might prompt them to intervene or react in myriad ways,
with all the political and military consequences such moves entail. This is
often the case when the military success of one group encourages others to
support its cause, confident in the belief they are backing the winning side
and gaining politically as a result.
In this way, military developments impact political dynamics and
feed into policy choices. It is important to remember that behind the abstract
notion of policy there are human decision-makers, whatever institutional
guise they may adopt. Those responsible for setting policy do not disappear at the outbreak of hostilities, rather they respond, adapt, and reassess
policies in the light of changing circumstances. Policy responds actively or
passively to the effects of its instrument.
The Ambiguity of Policy
Finally, Clausewitz believed the influence of policy on war was
essentially ambiguous in relation to the rise of extremes: the political
purpose neither necessarily causes a rise to extremes nor limits war, but it
is the central, though not only, determinant of both. The student should be
careful not to mistake war’s subordination to policy for the limitation of
war, as some have been known to do. As Clausewitz observes, when policy
requires an extreme effort, war will follow, precisely because of its element
of subordination. He states, “The closer . . . political probabilities drive war
toward the absolute, the more the belligerent states are involved and drawn
into its vortex.”36 Clausewitz’s dialectical argument in Book 1, Chapter 1,
demonstrates that limited and unlimited wars are largely politically determined, regardless of what appearances might suggest.
The matter is much more complex than political determination alone,
because war creates its own dynamics. Wars begun for ostensibly limited
objectives may rapidly escalate disproportionately to the original causes.
The magnitude of any war in reality, Clausewitz believed, is determined
by factors other than the political object—such as the effects of friction,
uncertainty, passion, and cultural norms—that cause the use of force to be
modified. In wars where policy essentially becomes a struggle for existence,
those extraneous forces inhibiting violence are seldom marginalized, and
only the friction inherent in war can serve to limit its ferociousness.
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Policy is ambiguous in terms of its effect on strategic performance.
The fact that Clausewitz believed war should be subject to the guiding
intelligence of policy was not an attempt to argue that policy is always
a wise or positive strategic force. For instance, policy can be unclear
and make unrealistic demands on the military, or it may even be wrong.
Nevertheless, sensible policy can have a positive impact on strategic effectiveness. Clearly stated objectives provide the military with a firm basis on
which to plan operations.
Reflections
Clausewitz believed that a rational thread, derived from the overarching direction of policy, runs through war, connecting individual combatants
to the higher purpose of war. The extent to which this influence is present
depends on unique circumstances and the character of the belligerents, but
Clausewitz held it was mistaken to conceive of war as ever being conducted
without a guiding purpose, be it shallow or vaguely articulated. Groups
attempt to achieve their ends through military means, even if this is a highly
problematic undertaking. This is especially true given the difficulty of
translation between the two realms, the uncertainty surrounding all decisions, the unstable nature of the military instrument, and the unpredictable
effects that any use of force entails. He did not believe war could always
be employed in a purely rational manner in pursuit of purely rational objectives. The relationship between policy and war is certainly not linear or
narrowly deterministic, but rather reciprocal and dynamic in nature. Even
if policy is definite about what it intends to achieve, the grammar of war
can cause objectives to radically change during hostilities and the extent to
which policy remains in control is highly contingent.
Placing emphasis on the political nature of war focuses attention
on the dynamics that underlie the use of organized force, the logic of the
distribution of relative power between groups. Power may be manifested
in radically different forms, but at its heart it is about the ways in which
social actors attempt to shape the context of their existence. When force is
employed, the logic of politics does not cease; it continues in its most potent
manifestation. Sometimes the main political lines in war will be distinct; at
other times, they will be barely perceptible or shrouded by the brute clash
of military forces. Often the political complexity can appear overwhelming,
particularly when war is composed of myriad forces each pursuing divergent agendas. Yet this simply reflects the reality of such complex political
relationships. In war, the scales of political power are constantly weighed
and re-weighed, victory is rarely final, and military success can promptly be
displaced by political failure.
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War is an instrument of policy and a continuation of the web of political interactions through the medium of force. So, a paradoxical situation
is apparent whereby war is imbued with rationality through its subordination to policy, while simultaneously deriving its unpredictable, irrational
dynamic from its continuation of politics. War impacts upon power constellations at multiple levels and in endless ways, which no individual or
organization can entirely control. Extraneous political considerations
encourage decisions that do not directly correspond with objectives or make
sense strategically. Not only is pure, rational action impossible in war, but
attempts to achieve rational outcomes can be thwarted by the play of chance,
influence of irrational impulses, or external political developments. War is
an instrument that can easily slip from the hands of those who wield it or,
while individuals may be successful in solving certain problems, they can
create others where least expected. Those contemplating war as a means
to achieve their ends have to understand the nature of the instrument, and
attempt to accurately read the political landscape in an effort to ensure
force is employed to produce desired effects, while minimizing adverse
or unexpected developments.
Modern states struggle to employ their militaries as effective instruments of policy, primarily due to complex political conditions rather than
any significant military shortcomings. Particularly in situations of insurgency and terrorism, the preeminent forms of warfare faced by the West
today, politics is central. As Paul Cornish recently argued, counterinsurgency “must be political first, political last, political always.”37 Force can be
an extremely blunt instrument in dealing with various forms of organized
violence and extreme care is required to avert unintended consequences.
Clausewitz recognized that an era dominated by the annihilation battle
and exemplified in Napoleon’s campaigns; in war, politics is “the first, the
supreme, the most far-reaching” consideration.38
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